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SEX, ALLIES AND BFOQS: THE CASE FOR
NOT ALLOWING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS TO
VIOLATE TITLE VII IN THE UNITED STATES
Keith Sealing*
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent to which foreign corporations as well as their domestic subsidiar-
ies can discriminate against American employees on the basis of sex, age, religion,
and national origin in a manner that would be acceptable under their own laws and
customs but inimical to American law is currently determined by a muddled jumble
of circuit court opinions interpreting a "[w]e express no view" Supreme Court
footnote. 1 As a result, American victims of sexual discrimination have much less
protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 when the discriminating
actor is a foreign corporation or its domestic subsidiary than they do when the
discrimination is by a wholly domestic corporation. This results from the courts'
interpretations of the relationship between a common Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation (FCN) provision that allows foreign corporations to hire
executive-level employees "of their choice," and Title VII and its § 703 bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception 3 that allows discrimination on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin (but not race) for certain jobs.
This Article will argue that this result, repugnant to the purpose of civil rights
laws, is the result of a series of badly reasoned courts of appeal cases and a lack of
guidance by the Supreme Court. However, because of the current Court's stance
in civil rights cases, now is perhaps not the best time for certiorari on any of the
issues raised herein. This Article will focus generally on sex discrimination under
Title VII, and will focus specifically on Japanese companies and their subsidiar-
ies,4 although the cases involve other countries and other antidiscrimination provi-
sions.
1I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT VERSUS THE FCN TREATY
A. The Civil Rights Act
Title VII states in pertinent part:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D., 1985,
Temple University School of Law; B.S., 1982, University of Northern Colorado.
1. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189-90 n.19 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
3. Id. at § 2000e-2(e).
4. There is no intent to single out the Japanese for particular opprobrium, however Japan is
not only an extremely heterogeneous society, but one in which the business world is also ex-
tremely male dominated. In addition, this Author has previously advised Japanese executives
new to United States culture on similar labor issues. For a succinct summary of the problem
see, Becky Kukuk, Note, Eastern Men, Western Women: Coping with the Effects of Japanese
Culture in the United States Workplace, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 177 (1998) (describing
Japanese men's treatment of female employees in Japan and the United States).
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employ employees .... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particu-
lar business or enterprise.5
B. The Treaty
The United States has a long history of negotiating bilateral FCN treaties; the
first was negotiated with France in 1778.6 The purpose of such treaties is to pro-
vide rules to protect the citizens of one country, and their property and other inter-
ests in the other country, as well as rules to govern trade and shipping. 7 The Japa-
nese Treaty was one of sixteen negotiated in the aftermath of World War II that
reflected the long standing tradition of FCN treaties but that were adapted to the
realities of the post-war growth in the importance of international commerce. 8
Under the treaties, foreign nationals were entitled to three levels of protection.
In looking at the treaties it should be noted that they were negotiated by the United
States from a position of strength, and with more concern for the rights of Ameri-
cans in a foreign country than for the reciprocal rights of that nation's nationals in
the United States, which was generally perceived as granting greater protections. 9
At one level, foreign nationals were guaranteed "national treatment," or the same
treatment accorded citizens. 10 However, at another level, in sensitive areas such
as shipbuilding and domestic air transport, foreigners were not guaranteed full
national treatment status but rather "most favored nation" treatment, a guarantee
that the foreign national would be treated as well as the nationals of any other
country in the host country.11 Finally, "[a]bsolute rules [in treaty provisions] were
intended to protect vital rights and privileges of foreign nationals in any situation,
whether or not a host government provided the same rights to the indigenous popu-
lation." 12
The key treaty provision (here using the Japanese Treaty, Article VIII(l) as
exemplar), provides that: "[Clompanies of either Party shall be permitted to en-
gage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." 13
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (emphasis added).
6. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Spiess I]
(citing Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 805, 806 (1958)).
7. Id. at 356 (citing Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of
Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMp. L. 229, 230-31 (1956)).
8. Id. at 359.
9. Thus the issues raised in the cases that followed, such as the rights of American workers in
America, were not in the minds of American negotiators or Congressional ratifiers of the trea-
ties.
10. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 359.
11. Id. at 360 (citing Walker, supra note 7, at 236).
12. Id. (citing Walker, supra note 6, at 811, 823; Walker, supra note 7, at 232). The Spiess I
court held that Article VIII(I) was just such an absolute rule, entitling Japanese corporations to
ignore United States civil rights laws. Id.
13. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII,
para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2063 [hereinafter Treaty] (emphasis added by the Court in Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)).
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To determine whether a company is a company of the United States or a com-
pany of Japan it is necessary to look at Article XXII(3) of the Japanese Treaty
which states:
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partner-
ships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and
whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable
laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed compa-
nies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories
of the other Party. 14
Thus, any American corporation, even if it is the wholly owned subsidiary of
a Japanese corporation, is an American corporation under Article XXII(3) of the
Japanese Treaty and is not entitled to the protection of Article VIII(l) in the United
States; or at least this would seem to be the case. But, in fact, it is not, in the
viewpoints of several circuits, as the cases below will demonstrate.
C. The Act Versus the Treaty
Most of the treaties being considered were negotiated in the immediate after-
math of World War II, prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Should
the subsequent legislation affect existing treaties? Turning to the issue of the Treaty
versus domestic American antidiscrimination statutes, one court concluded that
"in the absence of evidence suggesting Congress intended subsequent legislation
to affect existing treaty rights, and in the event the enactments conflict, the Treaty
must prevail .... [T]here is no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the
Article VIII(l) right in any way when it enacted Title VII and the ADEA." 15 But
there is likewise no evidence that Congress intended these treaty provisions to
create a broad loophole that would enable foreign corporations to violate Title VII
and the civil rights of their American employees. The record is silent and provides
no support to either side. How would one guess that the 1964 Congress would
answer the following question: In passing this legislation did you intend to assure
that Ford and General Motors can no longer discriminate on the basis of sex, but
that such discrimination is permissible at Honda's American plant?
The above court also noted that federal statutes should not be construed to
violate a treaty unless there is no other possible construction. 16 But here would
seem to be the exception that proves the rule: it is an impossible construction to
assume that Congress acted to stop discrimination in America by Americans while
allowing it to continue unchecked if perpetrated by Japanese (or Korean or Greek
or Italian) corporate branches operating here. Finally, treaties, including the FCN
Treaty in its various iterations, supercede inconsistent state law as well. 17
14. Id. at XXII (emphasis added by the Court in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. at 179).
15. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing McCulloch
v. Societedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963)); Spiess I, 643
F.2d at 356.
16. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 356 (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(quoted in McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. at 2 1)).
17. Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties are the "supreme law of the land")); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
230 (1942); DeTenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1975).
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III. THE CASES
This section looks at the various opinions on the issue over a twenty-year
period. Most involve the Japanese Treaty, but others examine a similar provision
in treaties with Denmark, Korea, Greece, and Italy. The claims involve sex dis-
crimination and national origin discrimination under Title VII, and age discrimina-
tion under the ADEA. In the first case, Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.,18 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a United
States subsidiary of a Danish corporation could not assert the Treaty protections of
its parent. 19 Then in 1981, the Second Circuit in Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc.20 held that a subsidiary could not rely on blanket protection under
the Treaty with Japan21 and the Fifth Circuit in Spiess I, over a strong dissent, held
that a subsidiary could do so.22 Asked to reexamine its opinion in light of the
conflict, the Linskey 23 court reaffirmed its original opinion.24 The following year
the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in Sumitomo but left open the ques-
tion of whether a subsidiary could assert its parent's Treaty rights.2 5 Then, be-
tween 1984 and 1999 the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits26 all answered
the Court's question by holding that subsidiaries could assert their parents' Treaty
protections. The only contrary opinion issued in this time period, despite substan-
tial academic commentary in opposition to the trend,27 was Kirmse v. Hotel Nikko
of San Francisco, Inc.,28 a state case out of California. 29
A. Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.
Linskey was an early case involving the Treaty with Denmark. James Linskey
was fired from the domestic subsidiary of a Danish corporation and claimed na-
tional origin discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the
ADEA. 30 The Danish parent argued, inter alia, that the Treaty protected it from
18. 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
19. Id.
20. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Avagliano II] (affirming Avagliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [hereinafter Avagliano I]).
21. Id.
22. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 355.
23. No. 77-C833, 1981 WL 27015, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1981).
24. Id.
25. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 189-90.
26. See discussion infra Parts II.G, I, F, and H, respectively.
27. See, e.g., Eric K. Kawabata, Potential Disregard of the Corporate Entity & U.S. Subsid-
iary Invocation of Japanese Parent's Treaty Rights, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 241 (1999); Gre-
gory S. Lane, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties: An Analysis of the Foreign
Corporation's Exemption From United States Labor Standards, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 383 (1989);
Tram N. Nguyen, When National Origin May Constitute a Bona Fide Occupational Qualifica-
tion: The Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty as an Affirmative Defense to a Title VII
Claim, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215 (1998); Stacey M. Rosner, Beyond the FCN Treaty:
Japanese Multinationals Under Title VII, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 871 (1983).
28. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
29. Id.
30. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Linskey
was employed by Heidelberg Eastern, Incorporated, a New York corporation, which was a wholly
owned subsidiary of East Asiatic Company, Incorporated, a New York corporation, which was,
in turn, wholly owned by East Asiatic Company, Limited, a Danish corporation. Id. at 1182.
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claims under Title VII and the ADEA.3 1 But the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York found nothing in the history of the Treaty that
would convince it that a foreign corporation had an absolute privilege to hire pro-
fessionals without regard for American laws prohibiting discrimination. 32
The court first noted that although some twenty-five post-World War II trea-
ties contained substantially similar provisions, the legislative reports and testi-
mony are silent as to their actual intent. 33 However, the legislative history of two
1955 treaties (Haiti and Turkey) containing the same provisions convinced the
court that: "[t]he purpose of these provisions was to exempt specialized employ-
ees of foreign countries and companies from the admission requirements of the
host country in specialized areas of endeavor. It was not intended to immunize
foreigners from claims under the host country's employment discrimination laws." 34
Further, the court noted that the Thailand Treaty was ratified by the Senate in 1967,
three years after Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
no discussion took place regarding the Treaty's effect on Title VII. 35 The court
concluded that the only possible inference was that the Treaty was not intended to
exempt foreign companies from Title VII. 36 The court saw the provision as prima-
rily aimed at granting foreign nationals "treaty trader" status under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, 37 which allows aliens from nations with which
the United States has a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to enter
the United States to operate an enterprise without being considered an immigrant
subject to immigration quotas and other restrictions. 38 The court concluded with
the important observation that "[a] different ruling would provide an unjustified
loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of Title VII. ' '39
B. Avagliano v. Sumitomo
In Avagliano 11,40 the Second Circuit held that the New York corporate sub-
sidiary of a Japanese trading company faced with a class action suit by female
31. Id. at 1183. The Danish Treaty contained essentially the same provision in Article VII(4)
as contained in the Japanese Treaty in Article VIII(l). Id. at 1183-86.
32. Id. at 1185. The court noted that the only other court to be confronted with this defense
did not reach the merits of the issue. Id. at 1185 n. 1. This was Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979), which at that time was in the Southern District of Texas. Two years
later the Fifth Circuit would reach a conclusion opposite to that of the Linskey court. Spiess I,
643 F.2d at 355. Spiess is discussed below.
33. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1185-86 n.5.
34. Id. at 1186.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1186-87.
37. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1995).
38. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1187 (citing Nippon Express, Inc. v.
Esperdy, 261 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).(employee of New York subsidiary of Japanese
corporation denied continuation of treaty trader status because of menial level of her work;
relationship of treaty trader under Immigration and Nationality Act and Article VII(l) of the
Treaty explained); Tokyo Sansei v. Esperdy, 298 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (employee ofNew York office of Japanese corporation denied treaty trader status because of menial level of
his work; relationship of treaty trader under Immigration and Nationality Act and Article VII(l)
of the Treaty explained)).
39. Id. at 1187. Linskey had also argued that the defendants discriminated against women,
but the court held that as a male he lacked standing to make the argument. Id.
40. Avagliano II, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), aff g 473 F. Supp 506 (D.C.N.Y. 1979), rev'd
457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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secretarial employees alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII could
rely on the protection of the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, but that this protection did not
insulate it from all Title VII scrutiny.4 1 The court concluded that discrimination
on the basis of Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ under certain circumstances
based on factors such as, inter alia, "acceptability to those persons with whom the
company ... does business." 42 As a practical matter, this would result in exactly
the structure that emerged at Sumitomo New York: American women working in
clerical roles for Japanese men.
The Avagliano plaintiffs were past and present female secretarial employees
of Sumitomo (America). All but one was a United States citizen; the exception
was a Japanese citizen living in the United States. 43 The suit was a class action in
which they argued that Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens
to top level positions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.4 4
Sumitomo moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that discrimination on the basis of Japa-
nese citizenship does not violate Title VII or § 1981 and that Sumitomo's practices
were protected under Article VIII(1 ) of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty between the United States and Japan. 45
In Avagliano I, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, holding that neither sex discrimination nor national origin discrimina-
tion actions could be brought under § 1981, dismissed that portion of the claim.4 6
However, the court held that because Sumitomo had incorporated in the United
States, it was not covered by Article VIII(l), and certified this issue for interlocu-
tory appeal to the Second Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).47
In Avagliano 11, the Second Circuit reversed in part.4 8 Initially, the court con-
cluded that the Treaty parties intended Article VIII(l) to cover locally incorpo-
rated subsidiaries of foreign companies, thus protecting Sumitomo Japan's Ameri-
can subsidiary.4 9 However, the court held that the Treaty language nevertheless
did not protect Sumitomo from Title VII.5 0 Finally, the court held Japanese citi-
zenship could be a BFOQ for high-level employment with a Japanese owned do-
mestic corporation, and thus remanded the matter to determine if Sumitomo's em-
ployment practices might fit this exception to Title VII.5 1
41. Id. at 558-59.
42. Id. at 559. But, as discussed more fully below, this is certainly not the law, at least outside
the context of FCN treaties. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (sex
not a BFOQ even though foreign clients might react negatively to a woman); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (sex not a BFOQ even though most airline
passengers prefer female flight attendants).
43. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 178 (1982).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 179.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 179-80.
2002]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
C. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America)
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),52 involved the New York subsidiary of the
Japanese corporation C. Itoh. Michael Spiess and other Americans argued that C.
Itoh's discrimination against American employees in hiring and promoting Japa-
nese nationals to management positions violated both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §
1981.53
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that
Article XXII(3) clearly stated that the nationality of a corporation was determined
by its place of incorporation, and thus C. Itoh & Co. (America) was an American
company for purposes of the Treaty.54 But the Fifth Circuit rejected this conten-
tion, admitting that the district court's interpretation was "compatible with the text
of the Treaty."55 The court held that Article XXII(3) was "not [intended] to deter-
mine which forms of corporate organization were entitled to assert Treaty rights,
but to ensure that unfamiliar organizations would be recognized as 'companies' by
the legal institutions of the respective countries."'56 After deciding to ignore the
wording of the Treaty, the court relied upon the following authorities to conclude
that "the consistent view of the State Department has been that American subsid-
iaries of Japanese corporations are entitled to the full protection of the Treaty": a
memorandum by State Department negotiators of the Treaty, an ambiguous state-
ment by FCN authority Herman Walker, 57 a 1976 airgram from Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, and a 1978 letter from the State Department. 58 Any other inter-
pretation of the Treaty would create an "unreasonable distinction" between Ameri-
can subsidiaries of Japanese companies and Japanese companies operating in the
United States through subsidiaries. 59
Turning to Article VIII(l), the court concluded that C. Itoh was exempt from
American employment discrimination laws to the extent that it could favor Japa-
nese over Americans in executive and technical positions. 60 The court rejected
Spiess's argument that Article ViIII() should be read to grant national treatment to
the Japanese in their employment decisions. 6 1
The court then turned to the question of whether Title VII, enacted after the
Treaty, was intended to invalidate inconsistent Treaty obligations.6 2 Even while
52. 643 F2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated by 457 U.S. 1128 (1982) [hereinafter Spiess II].
53. Id. at 355.
54. Id. at 356 (citing Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1979)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Walker "formulated the modem concept of FCN treaties," id. at 357 n.2, and wrote exten-
sively about treaties. See, e.g., Walker, supra notes 6, 7.
58. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d at 357-58.
59. Id. at 357. The court here followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Avagliano HI,which had been published but not yet vacated by the Supreme Court. Id. Spiess I was also
subsequently vacated and remanded in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Sumitomo. Spiess
II, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). The court was also aware of (and rejected the "literalism" of) the
opinions in United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957), and
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1980). Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 358.
60. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 363.
61. Id. at 360.
62. Section 1981, which Spiess also invoked, was enacted before the Treaty and therefore is
not part of this analysis. See Spiess 1, 643 F.2d at 362 n.9 (citing Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S.
315, 324 (1904)).
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noting that employment discrimination laws "occupy a high priority on the nation's
agenda," the court applied the rule that congressional intent to abrogate a Treaty
provision with subsequent legislation must be clearly expressed,63 and found no
such expression. 64
Finally, the court held that any right to discriminate pursuant to the Treaty was
not violative of Article 55 of the United Nations Charter,65 which encourages re-
spect for all human rights regardless of race, sex, language, or religion. The court
reached its conclusion because the issue at hand was national origin discrimination
(not one of the enumerated characteristics), the Charter was not a self-executing
obligation, and Title VII did not serve to execute the Charter but rather was a
completely independent statute. 66
D. Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. (Linskey II)
In Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc.,67 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York was asked to reconsider its opinion in light of the
conflict created by Spiess I and Avagliano 11. The court noted that the Avagliano 1I
opinion had solved the conflict between the Treaty and Title VII by imposing the
BFOQ requirement.6 8 The imposition forced the foreign company to show that
foreign citizenship was a BFOQ for a particular position rather than allowing blan-
ket exclusion from Title VII. The Fifth Circuit, however, in Spiess I held the oppo-
site by stating that foreign companies were not subject to the BFOQ requirement at
all. 69 Admitting that the Fifth Circuit's argument was quite compelling, 70 the
court concluded that in light of the "firm commitment" to support Title VII's at-
tempt to wipe out "all forms of invidious discrimination," the court found no rea-
son "to put a chink in that armor." 7 1 Finally, the court held that it would not be
overly burdensome to require foreign corporations to justify personnel decisions
by proving BFOQs. 72
E. Sumitomo v. Avagliano
In Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano,73 the Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit, holding that the New York subsidiary could not directly rely on
the protection of Article VIII(l). 74 However, the Court ended its opinion with a
footnote in which it stated that it expressed no view as to whether or not Japanese
citizenship could be a BFOQ, and whether the New York subsidiary, which had
only sought to directly invoke the Treaty's protection, could "assert any Article
63. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
64. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 362.
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
66. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 362-63.
67. No. 77-C833, 1981 WL 27015, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6,1981) [hereinafter Linskey II].
68. Id. at *2-3.
69. Id. The court rejected the argument that differences in the language of the two treaties
were significant. Id. at *2. The Japanese Treaty allowed foreign companies to select executives"of their choice" whereas the Danish Treaty allowed selection "regardless of nationality." Id.
70. Id. at *3. Curiously, the Linskey court does not mention the Reavley dissent, Spiess 1, 643
F.2d at 363, which supports its position.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
74. Id. at 189-90.
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VIII(l) rights of its parent."'75
The Court first looked at whether Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty pro-
vided a defense to a Title VII employment discrimination suit against an American
subsidiary of a Japanese company.76 The Court began its analysis by noting that
interpretation of the treaty "must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty
itself. The clear import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words
of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with
the intent or expectations of its signatories.,' 77 Accordingly, the Court turned to
the Treaty language 78 that allowed companies of Japan or the United States to hire
certain upper level employees of their choice while in the other country's terri-
tory.79
The Court noted the ironic fact that these provisions were enacted at the insis-
tence of the United States despite the opposition of other countries, including Ja-
pan, to protect the employment of Americans abroad, and "to prevent the imposi-
tion of ultranationalistic policies with respect to essential executive and technical
personnel." 80
Having concluded that the Treaty "clearly" only applied to the companies of
one country operating in the other, the Court turned to the definitional section of
the Treaty, Article XXII(3), which states that a company incorporated in the terri-
tory of a party is a company of that party.8 1
Based upon the language of Article XXII(3), the Court concluded that
Sumitomo was a company of the United States, not of Japan, and as such could not
"invoke the rights provided in Article VIII(I), which are available only to compa-
nies of Japan operating in the United States and to companies of the United States
operating in Japan."'82
The Court then noted that the governments of Japan and the United States,
speaking through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Depart-
ment respectively, agreed with the Court's interpretation of the Treaty.8 3 In light
of these facts, the Court stated:
Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties. When the
parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that
interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordi-
narily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation. 84
The Court concluded that Sumitomo was not covered by Article VIII(1) of the
Treaty, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded.85 This ending
would have accorded American workers in the employ of the American subsidiar-
ies of Japanese corporations all the rights protected by Title VII. However, at the
end of the opinion was footnote nineteen, which stated:
75. Id. at 190n.19.
76. Id. at 177-78.
77. Id. at 180 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).
78. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
79. Sumitomo Shoji Am. Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 181.
80. Id. at 181 n.6 (quoting Walker, supra note 7, at 234).
81. Id. at 182.
82. Id. at 182-83.
83. Id. at 183-85.
84. Id. at 185.
85. Id. at 189-90.
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We express no view as to whether Japanese citizenship may be a bona fide occu-
pational qualification for certain positions at Sumitomo or as to whether a busi-
ness necessity defense may be available. There can be little doubt that some
positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the United States
call for great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the culture,
customs, and business practices of that country. However, the Court of Appeals
found the evidentiary record insufficient to determine whether Japanese citizen-
ship was a bona fide occupational qualification for any of Sumitomo's positions
within the reach of Article VIII(l). Nor did it discuss the bona fide occupational
qualification exception in relation to respondents' sex discrimination claim or the
possibility of a business necessity defense. Whether Sumitomo can support its
assertion of a bona fide occupational qualification or a business necessity de-
fense is not before us.
We also express no view as to whether Sumitomo may assert any Article
VII(I) rights of its parent.86
Thus, the Court left open two avenues with which to undermine the purpose of
Title VII: (1) a finding that Japanese citizenship was a BFOQ would result in a
homogeneous management team of all Japanese ethnic males; and (2) a finding
that an American subsidiary could assert the Treaty rights of its Japanese parent
would put Treaty Article VIII(l) at odds with Title VII. Both avenues of attack on
Title VII would eventually be explored.
The two issues thus raised were not answered by the case itself, as the class
action was settled after about four more years of discovery and negotiation. 87 The
ambiguity as to the applicability of the BFOQ defense clearly affected the settle-
ment terms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in approving the settlement, stated that "[it is not clear how broad a BFOQ
defense would have been recognized by the Court in this case, but it may be as-
sumed that this defense would have limited the scope of any relief granted to some
or all of the class."'88 The company was required to make good faith efforts to
place women in twenty-three to twenty-five percent of the company's exempt po-
sitions. However, the top ten management spots were still to be staffed by rotating
employees from the Japanese parent, 89 clearly resulting in the positions being filled
by male Japanese nationals. The agreement also required that after three years,
five percent of the women in exempt jobs would obtain senior management posi-
tions, and seven percent would obtain senior sales positions. 90 The company also
agreed to provide back-pay and damages.9 1
F. Wickes v. Olympic Airways
In Wickes v. Olympic Airways,9 2 the Sixth Circuit found a limited, not a blan-
86. Id. at 189-90 n.19 (citation omitted).
87. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., No. 77 Civ. 5641 (CHT), 82 Civ. 4930 (CHT),
1987 WL 14653 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) [hereinafter Avagliano III]. The consent decree pro-
vided remedial and monetary relief for approximately 1200 class members. Id. at *3.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *4-5. The company was to establish a $580,000 fund that would pay $1500 to
$6000 to each former employee with two or more years of service, and a $400,200 fund to pay
similar amounts to present employees with two or more years of service. Id. In addition, the
named plaintiffs were awarded $15,000 each for their ten-year-long effort. Id.
92. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
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ket, right under the U.S.-Greece Treaty.93 Wickes is not precisely on point because
in addition to involving a different treaty 94 and culture, it involved a foreign cor-
poration owned by the Greek government, not a domestic subsidiary thereof. 95
Also, the issue was resolved under Michigan's statute prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of age or national origin, not the ADEA and Title VII. 96 However, the
case is instructive as to the extent of protection from domestic antidiscrimination
that a similar treaty provision allows.9 7
In light of the court's careful review of the Treaty's legislative history, the
court concluded that it contained: "substantial evidence that Article XII was in-
tended to be a narrow privilege to employ Greek citizens for certain high level
positions, not a wholesale immunity from compliance with labor laws prohibiting
other forms of employment."'98 The court noted that the post-World War II treaties
were negotiated in the context of percentile restrictions that required American
companies working abroad to hire certain percentages of host country citizens.99
The treaties were enacted before the Civil Rights Act or the ADEA. The court
noted that nine states had already enacted antidiscrimination employment laws,
even though there was nothing in the legislative history of the treaties that sug-
gested they were intended to override these laws, and a State department spokes-
man stated that such laws would be unaffected. 100
The court did hold that the Treaty would prevail over Michigan law if the
plaintiff were to argue on remand that citizenship (discrimination upon which Michi-
gan law does prohibit) and national origin (discrimination upon which Michigan
does not prohibit) are synonymous. 10 1
93. Id. at 366.
94. However, the Treaty was negotiated in the same time period as the Japanese Treaty andwas considered in the same Senate hearings. Id. at 366 (citing Commercial Treaties: Hearings
on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark,
Greece, Finland, Germany and Japan Before the Subcomm. on Commercial Treaties of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Comm., 83d Cong. 6 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings]).
95. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d at 364.
96. Id. Wickes sued under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act of 1976, MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.2202 (West Supp. 1984). He failed to make timely administrative claims under the
ADEA and Title VII before the applicable statutes of limitation expired. Wickes v. Olympic
Airways, 745 F.2d at 364.
97. Article XII(4) of the 1951 Treaty with Greece allows companies of either party to hirenationals "of their choice" in the other country. Wickes v Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d at 365
(citing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Aug. 3 & Dec. 26, 1951, U.S.-Greece, 5
U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 367 n.1 (citing HENRY STEINER & DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
37-38 (1968)); Commercial Treaties: Hearings on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation Between the United States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 82d Cong.
26 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 Hearings]. The Steiner and Vagts text has been superceded by
DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 21-29 (2d ed. 1998) (including abbreviated
version of Sumitomo).
100. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d at 368 (citing 1953 Hearings, supra note 94, at 4-
5; Jonathan B. Schwartz, Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The
Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 951 n.23 (1978-79) (the states were Con-
necticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Washington)).
101. Id.
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G. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines
The task of interpreting footnote nineteen of Sumitomo fell first upon the Third
Circuit in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,102 a case not involving sexual dis-
crimination, but rather involving discrimination based on national origin and age,
and also not involving Japan, but rather involving South Korea, albeit a similar
culture and an identical Treaty provision. 103 The court held that the BFOQ excep-
tion not only applied but should be construed more broadly in the international
context in light of Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty. 104 Next, the court concluded
that conflicts between Article VIII(l) and Title VII must be resolved in favor of the
Treaty. 105 Further, the plaintiffs were held not to prevail just by proving "dispar-
ate impact," as they could in the case of domestic corporations under Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 106 rather, they were faced with the more difficult burden of proving
intent to discriminate. 107
Thomas MacNamara, a fifty-seven-year-old American citizen, began working
for Korean Airlines (KAL) in 1974.108 KAL discharged six American managers
nationally and replaced them with four Korean citizens, replacing MacNamara
with a forty-two-year-old Korean man who previously had been in charge of KAL's
Washington office. 109 MacNamara argued that KAL had discriminated against
him "on the basis of race, national origin and age, and additionally that he was
entitled to recover because 'all of Defendant's American Sales Managers in the
United States were replaced by Koreans."' 110
KAL's motion to dismiss was based on the argument that its conduct was
privileged under the terms of the Korean FCN Treaty, which like the Japanese
Treaty provides in Article VIII(l) that companies of either party are allowed to
hire certain upper level employees of their choice within the other country. 111 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had held that
Title VII and the ADEA were in conflict with Article VIII(l) of the Treaty and that
the Treaty controlled in employment situations involving essential personnel that
favored Korean citizens. 112 The Third Circuit noted that the district court's deci-
sion was consistent with Spiess 1,113 in which the Fifth Circuit held that the wholly
owned American subsidiary of a Japanese company was protected by the Treaty. 114
This essentially answered the question left open by the Supreme Court in footnote
nineteen.
102. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 1138.
104. Id. at 1148.
105. Id.
106. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs involved Title VII, the employment discrimination provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 425. An intelligence test and a high school diploma
were required for the job. Id. at 426. This had a discriminatory impact on African-American
applicants but there was no proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 428. A unanimous Court held
that where the effect was to disadvantage African-Americans, and there was no showing that the
criteria used actually affected job performance, there was a violation of Title VII. Id. at 429-33.
107. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1148.
108. Id. at 1137.
109. Id. at 1138.
110. Id. at 1137.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 356.
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The Third Circuit then turned to the Second Circuit's analysis of Avagliano II,
describing its position as suggesting that:
The Treaty and Title VII could be reconciled by reference to Title VII's "bona
fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception. Although ordinarily the BFOQ
exception is narrowly construed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
that interpreting it more broadly in the context of FCN Treaties was warranted by
the terms of Article VIII(l) and would give foreign employers reasonable lati-
tude to hire solely nationals for its management positions. 115
Further, the court took heed of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the BFOQ
exception in the international context, which justified discrimination where:
The unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United
States, including such factors as a person's (1) Japanese linguistic and cultural
skills, (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business prac-
tices, (3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or parent
enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the com-
pany or branch does business. 116
As discussed more fully below, the fourth basis provides an avenue for sexual
discrimination for the American subsidiaries of any foreign nation whose culture
finds men more "acceptable" than women in business relations. 117 However, the
court noted that the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, leaving open the issues
discussed in the final footnote. 118
Because the court agreed that MacNamara was an "executive" within the mean-
ing of the Treaty and that the right to "engage" 119 foreign nationals must include
the right to replace an American with a foreign national, the court was confronted
with the issues raised by other circuits in Spiess I, Avagliano 11, and Wickes. 120
The court stated:
We agree with the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that Article
VIII(l) goes beyond securing the right to be treated the same as domestic compa-
nies and that its purpose, in part, is to assure foreign corporations that they may
have their business in the host country managed by their own nationals if they so
desire. 121
The court saw no conflict between the Treaty, Title VII, and the ADEA, which
proscribe discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, or age, 12 2 where the
company was simply hiring its own nationals. 123 Thus, a foreign corporation could
not "deliberately" reduce the age of its workforce by hiring younger nationals. 124
However, the court stated:
On the other hand, to the extent Title VII and the ADEA proscribe personnel
decisions based on citizenship solely because of their disparate impact on older
managers, a particular racial group, or persons whose ancestors are not from the
115. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1139 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. (quoting Avagliano II, 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d. Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added).
117. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
118. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1139-40.
119. Id. at 1141. MacNamara had unsuccessfully argued that the Treaty right to "engage"
personnel did not incorporate the right to fire or reassign personnel. Id.
120. Id. at 1140.
121. Id.
122. Note that because MacNamara was an ADEA age discrimination case, sex was not
discussed, but the analysis is the same. Id. 1140-41.
123. Id. at 1141.
124. Id.
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foreign country involved, we perceive a potential conflict and conclude that it
must be resolved in favor of Article VIII(l). 125
The court agreed with the parties that Article VIII(l) gave foreign businesses
"the right to engage 'executive personnel ... of their choice' ... [and that this
power] includes the right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship; thus foreign
businesses clearly have the right to choose citizens of their own nation as execu-
tives because they are such citizens."' 126 However, the court rejected KAL's argu-
ment that Article VIII(l) provides immunity from Title VII and the ADEA for any
executive hiring decision that favors a citizen of one's own nation. 127
Turning to the issue of the Treaty versus the antidiscrimination statutes, the
court concluded that in the "absence of evidence suggesting Congress intended
subsequent legislation to affect existing treaty rights, and in the event the enact-
ments conflict, the Treaty must prevail .... [T]here is no evidence that Congress
intended to abrogate the Article VIII(l) right in any way when it enacted Title VII
and the ADEA." 12 8 Further, the court found no conflict between proscribed na-
tional origin discrimination and permitted citizenship discrimination, describing
them as "distinct phenomena," and holding that the trier of fact can distinguish one
from the other. 129
The court, having held that KAL could not purposefully or intentionally dis-
criminate on the basis of age, race, or national origin, noted that Title VII and the
ADEA, following Griggs, prohibit "facially neutral employment practices [that]
have a discriminatory effect or 'disparate impact' on protected groups, without
proof that the employer adopted these practices with a discriminatory motive."'130
Noting that imposing such a standard would "pose a substantial problem in dispar-
ate impact litigation for corporations hailing from countries, including perhaps
Korea, whose populations are largely homogeneous," the court concluded that dis-
parate impact liability under Title VII and the ADEA conflicted with Article VIII(1)
and could not be imposed. 13 1 Thus, MacNamara was forced to prove the more
difficult point that KAL's intent was to discriminate against him on the basis of his
age.
H. Fortino v. Quasar Co.
Further eroding the protection accorded to Americans, the Seventh Circuit in
Fortino v. Quasar Co.,132 held that an American corporation could assert the Treaty
rights of its Japanese parent in defending a discrimination claim. 133 However,
Judge Posner's opinion is based at least in part on a factual misunderstanding of
Japanese culture.
Quasar is a division of an American subsidiary wholly owned by Matsushita
of Japan. 134 After a year in which Quasar lost $20 million, Matsushita sent Mr.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1144.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1146 (citations omitted).
129. Id. However, as discussed below, such is not the case when dealing with very homoge-
neous societies such as Korea or Japan.
130. Id. at 1147-48.
131. Id. at 1148.
132. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 393.
134. Id. at 391.
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Nishikawa from Japan to correct the problem. 135 In the reorganization, a number
of American executives were fwed, including plaintiffs Fortino, Meyers, and Schultz.
No Japanese nationals were fired, although two were rotated back to Japan and
replaced with one Japanese national. 136 All Japanese nationals received pay in-
creases; none of the retained Americans received pay increases. 137 Two of the
three Japanese-Americans, none of whom were executives, were fired.138 In a
videotape (the admission of which was ultimately held to be reversible error) an-
other Japanese expatriate stated that the reorganization of another Quasar group
would result in a younger average age which, in turn, would enable these younger,
more vigorous employees to spend more time helping the other staff. 139 The plain-
tiffs claimed age and national origin discrimination under the ADEA and Title
VII. 140 The judge and jury agreed, awarding $2.5 million in damages and $400,000
in attorneys' fees and costs. 14 1
While Title VII protects Americans of non-Japanese origin from discrimina-
tion in favor of persons of Japanese origin, it does not forbid discrimination on the
ground of citizenship, Judge Posner stated. 142 Further, even though citizenship
and national origin are "highly correlated" in countries like Japan, he concluded
that using this fact to infer national origin discrimination would "nullify" the Treaty,
regardless of whether one is attempting to prove intent or disparate impact. 143
Judge Posner, noting the Supreme Court's expression in footnote nineteen of
the Sumitomo decision, then turned to the key issue: whether Quasar, not a Japa-
nese company "in a technical sense," could rely on the Treaty. 144 The court con-
cluded that, at least on the facts presented, a subsidiary may assert a parent's Treaty
right "at least to the extent necessary to prevent the treaty from being set at
naught." 145 But what facts would justify the opposite conclusion? Judge Posner
asked:
But suppose a Japanese company buys an American company, fires all of its new
subsidiary's occidental executives because it is prejudiced against occidentals,
and replaces them with Japanese citizens. The question would then arise whether
the treaty of friendship in effect confers a blanket immunity from Title VII. On
this there are different views. 146
But how does one obtain evidence of prejudice, particularly if the disparate impact
test cannot be applied? Here the court noted as evidence of a lack of national
135. Id. at 392.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Judge Posner's misplaced reliance on this fact is discussed infra. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-49.
139. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d at 395.
140. Id. at 391.
141. Id. at 392. In the court below, the ADEA claim went to a jury but Title VII authorized
only equitable relief and so was decided by the judge. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306,
1307 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Note that as to events occurring after the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Title VII plaintiffs can seek monetary damages. Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138
F.3d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1998) (bifurcating claim where some alleged damages occurred before
November 21, 1991, and some occurred after).
142. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d at 392.
143. Id. at 392-93.
i44. Id. at 393 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,189 n.19 (1982)).
145. Id.
146. Id. Posner compares MacNamara and Linskey with Spiess. Id.
[Vol. 55:1
SEX, ALLIES, AND BFOQS
origin discrimination the fact that two of Quasar's Japanese-American employees
were fired. 147 Judge Posner seems to believe that since the Japanese-Americans
had a national origin in Japan but were not Japanese citizens, this demonstrates
that firing decisions were made on the basis of citizenship, not national origin or
race. This assumption requires that the Japanese nationals harbor a national origin
based affection for Japanese-Americans that they apparently ignored in making
personnel decisions based solely on citizenship. But in fact the opposite is the
case; Japanese nationals are uncomfortable with what they perceive as the am-
biguous loyalties of Japanese-Americans and are actually more at ease with white
Americans who present no such ambiguities. Thus, Quasar's decision to fire two
of the three Japanese-Americans provided no evidence of whether Fortino was
fired because he was not ethnically Japanese or because he was not a Japanese
citizen.
Turning to the ADEA claim, the court held that there was enough evidence of
age discrimination to make a case before the jury, but stated that there must be a
new trial because of two errors by the lower court, 14 8 and that, in any case, Fortino
(but not Meyers and Schultz) had signed a valid waiver of the claims presented. 149
I. Papaila v. Uniden America Corp.
In yet another blow to the protection accorded to Americans, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Papaila v. Uniden America
Corp.,15 0 held that an American corporation could assert the Treaty rights of its
Japanese parent in defending a discrimination claim. 15 1
Theodore Papaila argued that Uniden America, an Indiana corporation and
subsidiary of Uniden Corporation (Uniden Japan), an electronics manufacturer,
breached his contract on April 1, 1992, by reducing his compensation, demoting
him to the position of Vice President, and engaging in a pattern of discriminatory
conduct based on his age, race, and national origin, and ultimately firing him. 152
Papaila sued under Title VII for race and national origin discrimination, and under
the ADEA for age discrimination. Uniden America defended by asserting that the
Treaty allowed it to exercise the rights of Uniden Japan, its parent corporation, to
favor Japanese citizens in employment, and therefore, it was not liable for dis-
147. Id. at 393-94.
148. Id. at 394-95. First, a videotape was admitted, in which Mr. Omoto stated that the
reorganization of another Quasar group would result in a younger average age which, in turn,
would enable these younger, more vigorous employees to spend more time helping the other
staff. Id. at 395. The court held this was inadmissible because Omoto was in an entirely differ-
ent division of Quasar and had no part in the firing of the plaintiffs. Id. 395-96. Second, An-
thony Mirabelli, who was also fired from Quasar but who was not a plaintiff, testified that
Nishikawa's predecessor told him that Nishikawa "planned 'to reduce costs by targeting the
older employees' for termination." Id. at 396. However, even though Mirabelli was listed on a
list of 109 "may call" witnesses, the court held that Fortino had violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(e) by failing to supplement an early discovery request to warn Quasar of Mirabelli's"smoking gun" testimony, and that the appropriate sanction should have been to bar Mirabelli's
testimony. Id. at 396-97.
149. Id. at 394-95. Fortino signed the release in exchange for additional severance benefits
but testified at trial that he did not understand it. Id. at 394. The jury's belief of this "went
beyond the bounds of reason." Id.
150. 840 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
151. Id. at 447.
152. Id. at 443.
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criminating against Papaila on the basis of his race and national origin. 15 3
Uniden did not dispute that such employees were treated differently than
American employees, and argued that the only basis for Papaila's claims of race
and national origin discrimination is the preferential treatment given to Japanese
expatriates. 154
The court noted that the Supreme Court had held that a subsidiary incorpo-
rated in the United States is not directly covered by Article VIII(l), but that it had
left open in footnote nineteen in Sumitomo the question of whether an American
company could assert its Japanese parent's rights under Article VIII(l), and then
noted that Fortino was the only opinion to address that issue. 155 Fortino had held
that an American subsidiary of a Japanese parent company could assert the Article
VIII(l) FCN Treaty rights of its parent. The Papaila court decided to follow the
Seventh Circuit and concluded that "Uniden must be allowed to assert the treaty
rights of Uniden Japan in order to 'prevent the treaty from being set at naught."' 156
However, the court added, a Japanese company does not have "blanket authority"
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but
"[t]he FCN Treaty language does, however, mean that '[clompanies have a right to
decide which executives and technicians will manage their investment in the host
country, without regard to host country laws."" 157
J. Kirmse v. Hotel Nikko
In Kirmse v. Hotel Nikko of San Francisco, Inc.,15 8 the Court of Appeal of
California lauded Judge Reavley's Spiess I dissent, criticized Fortino and Papaila,
and held that a California subsidiary of a Japanese company cannot make a blanket
claim for immunity under Article VIII(l). 159 The court noted, however, a com-
pany still might succeed in such an argument "under appropriate circumstances,"
such as where the discriminatory decision was made in Japan by the parent and
imposed upon the subsidiary. 160
W. Andrews Kirmse was fired from his management position in Hotel Nikko
of San Francisco, Inc., a California corporation, which in turn is wholly owned by
a Japanese corporation. 16 1 After he was replaced by a Japanese national, Kirsme
filed suit alleging four causes of action: breach of contract, discrimination on the
basis of race and national origin in violation of the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and inten-
tional interference with contractual relations. 162 The trial court granted summary
153. Id. Uniden did not dispute that Japanese employees were treated differently than American
employees. Id.
154. Id. at 446.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991)).
157. Id. at 446-47 (quoting Spiess I, 643 F.2d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 1981)).
158. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Dist. App. 1996).
159. Id. at 100.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 97. More precisely, Nikko was wholly owned by Japan Airlines Development
(U.S.A.), which is wholly owned by Japan Airlines Development Corporation, Ltd., a Japanese
Corporation. Id. at 97 n. 1.
162. Id. at 97.
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judgment for Hotel Nikko on all four issues, stating that the second and third is-
sues were barred by the FCN Treaty. 163
The Court of Appeal of California began its analysis by stating that the Su-
preme Court held in Sumitomo that the Treaty "does not apply to a domestically
incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese corporation." 164 This is the strongest pos-
sible interpretation of the Sumitomo holding. The court next turned to Justice
Reavley's Spiess I dissent, describing it as a "remarkably detailed and cogent tex-
tual analysis of the treaty . . 165 The court then concluded that "[t]he Supreme
Court evidently found the [Reavley] opinion persuasive since it vacated the Spiess
I judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Sumitomo
decision." 166 Endorsement of the court's opinion is also a bit of a stretch, as the
Supreme Court likely would have vacated and remanded Spiess I regardless of the
dissent.
The court then turned to the Fortino decision and the Papaila case that "fol-
lowed the Fortino decision without adding any new analysis." 167 The court noted
that in Fortino, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Sumitomo on the "slender fac-
tual basis" that the plaintiffs in Sumitomo failed to allege that the Japanese parent
had dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory behavior.168 The court concluded:
"We doubt that this distinction has much practical significance. The parent com-
pany will always have the power to control the management of its subsidiary...
,"169 The court-assailed the Fortino court's assertion that any other conclusion
would render the Treaty's protection meaningless. 17 0 Again turning to Judge
Reavley's dissent in Spiess I, the court stated that the drafters of the Treaty had
gone to great pains to distinguish the rights of foreign corporations operating in the
United States and domestically incorporated subsidiaries of foreign corporations. 17 1
The court further stated that the purpose of the Treaty is to allow foreign compa-
nies to operate on an equal basis with domestic companies, in part by allowing
them to form domestic subsidiaries. 172 Also, it is consistent with this purpose to
subject foreign corporations to the same laws as the domestic ones with which
they compete. 173 Finally, the court argued that the parent could avoid the problem
by operating as a branch rather than a domestic subsidiary. 174
The court, however, did admit that the issue raised by the Sumitomo Court in
footnote nineteen "continues to pose serious and unresolved questions. ' 175 The
court concluded that "a domestic subsidiary of a Japanese company may well be
able to fashion, under appropriate circumstances, a valid basis for asserting stand-
ing to raise the parent's treaty rights, at least with respect to certain employees., 1 76
163. Id.
164. Id. at 99.
165. Id. at 100.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 101.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 101-02.
172. Id. at 102.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The court supported its opinion with the examples of piercing the corporate veil of
a subsidiary to reach the parent or asserting the rights of a closely related third party. Id.
176. Id.
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However, the court gave no indications as to what those circumstances might be,
and couched its conclusion in terms of standing to raise the parent's Treaty rights.
Hotel Nikko did not couch its argument in terms of standing but instead relied on
the Fortino holding. 177 Further, the decision to fire Kirmse was made in the United
States by an executive of the domestic subsidiary, albeit a Japanese national with-
out the Japanese parent's involvement. 17 8
K. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries
In Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries Co., 179 the Seventh Circuit relied upon
MacNamara, Papaila, Fortino, and Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc. 180 in a case
arising under the Korean Treaty. 181 Harry Weeks claimed, inter alia, race and
national origin discrimination after he was fired by an American subsidiary of
Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., a Korean company. 182 The case adds little
additional insight into the issues being considered herein.
L. Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp.
In Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp.,183 the Fifth Circuit confronted a claim
involving the French Treaty when W.G. Bennett filed claims under Title VII, the
ADEA, and § 1981.184 Bennett, an employee of Total Minatome Corp. (TMC), a
Delaware corporation that was the wholly owned subsidiary of TOTAL, S.A., a
French corporation, was demoted and replaced with a younger French expatri-
ate. 185 A jury agreed with his claims and awarded him $1,422,100 in back pay,
compensatory and punitive damages, and $391,722.73 in legal fees. 186 The Fifth
Circuit followed its earlier decision in Papaila, concluded that TMC's decisions
were dictated by its French parent, and saw no race or national origin discrimina-
tion, but only permissible discrimination based upon French citizenship. 187
177. Id.
178. Id. There will be no further discussion of Kirmse as the judgment was nevertheless
affirmed for reasons unknown, and the opinion was only certified for partial publication. Id. at
96.
179. 126 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 1997).
180. 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997). In Wallace, Judge Posner was again faced with a situa-
tion in which a American was fired from the American subsidiary of a Japanese company. Id. at
1402. The bulk of Posner's opinion focused on the propriety of summary judgment in an em-
ployment discrimination case. However, Posner concluded that the plaintiff was caught be-
tween Sylla and Charybdis. Id. at 1401. Wallace was fired by his American supervisor for
substantial failings and could not make out a prima facie case under Title VII. Id. If, however,
Wallace argued that the firing was engineered by a Japanese executive who had told him that
"all Americans are stupid," then "Wallace runs smack into Article VIII(l) of the Treaty..." Id.
He concluded "[i]f, however, the parent dictates the personnel decisions of the U.S. subsidiary,
those decisions are protected by the Treaty." Id.
181. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d at 934.
182. Id. at 929.
183. 138 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1998).
184. Id. at 1056.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1057.
187. Id. at 1058-59.
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M. Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co.
Most recently, Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co.188 summarized the law as al-
lowing an American subsidiary to assert Article VIII(l) protection where the par-
ent dictates personnel decisions. 189 Santerre, an American woman, alleged sexual
harassment and retaliation against Agip, a Delaware corporation that was the sub-
sidiary of an Italian corporation. 190 Applying a differently worded Treaty provi-
sion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also stated
that the U.S.-Italian Treaty did not shield Agip from a Title VII sexual discrimina-
tion claim. 19 1
IV. ANALYSIS-LEAST POSSIBLE PROTECTION IS ACCORDED
The progression of the cases through the circuit courts delineates a path to the
least amount of protection for American women (and others protected by Title VII
and the ADEA) working for multinational companies of FCN Treaty partners,
whether operating as domestically incorporated subsidiaries or as branches. This
Part first critically reviews that progression.
First, this Part begins with an ambiguous Treaty provision that allows compa-
nies of one party to "engage accountants and other technical experts, executive
personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." 192 This issue
was addressed correctly the first time a court faced it. Recall that in Linskey the
Danish parent argued, inter alia, that the Treaty protected it from claims under
Title VII and the ADEA. 19 3 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York concluded that "[w]hile this defense to a Title VII action is a
novel one, the history of the provision belies any claim that a foreign corporation
has an absolute privilege to hire professional and other specialized employees of
their choice irrespective of the American laws prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation." 194
The court first noted that although some twenty-five post-World War II trea-
ties contained substantially similar provisions, the legislative reports and testi-
mony are silent as to their actual intent. 195 However, the legislative history of two
1955 treaties--one with Haiti, one with Turkey-containing the same provisions
convinced the court that: "the purpose of these provisions was to exempt special-
ized employees of foreign countries and companies from the admissions require-
ments of the host country in specialized areas of endeavor. It was not intended to
immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's employment discrimi-
188. 45 F. Supp. 2d. 558 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
189. Id. at 572 n.2.
190. Id. at 564.
191. Id. at 577.
192. Treaty, supra note 13.
193. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Danish
Treaty contained essentially the same provision in Article VII(4) as contained in the Japanese
Treaty in Article VIII(l). Id.
194. Id. at 1185. The court noted that the only other court to be confronted with this defense
did not reach the merits of the issue. Id. at 1185 n. 1. This was the Spiess case, which at that time
was in the Southern District of Texas. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F Supp. I (S.D.
Tex. 1979). Two years later, the Fifth Circuit in Spiess I would reach a conclusion opposite that
of the Linskey court.
195. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1185-86 n.5.
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nation laws." 196 Further, the court noted that the Thailand Treaty was ratified by
the Senate in 1967, three years after Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and no discussion took place regarding the Treaty's effect on
Title VII. 19 7 The court concluded that the only possible inference was that the
Treaty was not intended to exempt foreign companies from Title VII. 198 The court
saw the provision as primarily aimed at granting foreign nationals "treaty trader"
status under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,199 which allows aliens
from nations with which the United States has a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, to enter the United States to operate an enterprise without being
considered an immigrant subject to immigration quotas and other restrictions.200
The court concluded with the important observation that "[a] different ruling would
provide an unjustified loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of
Title VII. ' '201
Second, there exists what should be a not so ambiguous Treaty provision that
states that for purposes of the Treaty, a company is simply a company of the coun-
try in which it is incorporated. Thus, for example, a subsidiary of a Japanese
corporation that is incorporated under the laws of New York should clearly be a
New York corporation, and not subject to the first Treaty provision, regardless of
how it is interpreted. That should end the discussion for domestically incorporated
subsidiaries, but as demonstrated, it does not.
The best refutation of this argument is found in Spiess I. Judge Reavley's
dissent remains the best articulated rebuttal to the position held by the majority of
circuits; it has been unrefuted (but essentially ignored) after more than twenty
years. In Spiess 1, the majority rejected Spiess's argument that Article VIII(1)
should be read to grant national treatment to the Japanese in their employment
decisions. 20 2 Instead, the court found it apparent from the phrase "of their choice"
that Article VIII(l) did not merely grant national treatment, but rather was an "ab-
solute rule" permitting the Japanese to staff their overseas investments with their
nationals. 20 3 But if it is truly absolute, why can't Japanese companies hiring ex-
ecutives "of their choice" choose to hire only white males for the positions staffed
by Americans? The court created a conundrum by holding that Article VIII(1) is
an absolute rule, but applying it as absolute only as to nationality.
Judge Reavley began his dissent by stating that the purpose of the definitional
section of the Treaty, Article XXII(3), was to bridge the cultural gap between the
196. Id. at 1186 (citations omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1186-87.
199. Id. at 1187 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (2000)).
200. Id. at 1185 n.10. See also Nippon Express U.S.A., Inc. v. Esperdy, 261 F. Supp. 561
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (employee of New York subsidiary of Japanese corporation denied continua-
tion of treaty trader status because of menial level of her work; relationship of treaty trader
under Immigration and Nationality Act and Article VII(I) of the Treaty explained); Tokyo Sansei
(N.Y.) Inc. v. Esperdy, 298 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (employee of New York office of
Japanese corporation denied treaty trader status because of menial level of his work; relation-
ship of treaty trader under Immigration and Nationality Act and Article VII(l) of the Treaty
explained).
201. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1187. Linskey had also argued that the
defendants discriminated against women, but the court held that as a male he lacked standing to
make the argument. Id.
202. Spiess I, 643 F.2d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 1981).
203. See id. at 360-61.
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United States and Japan regarding the various forms of commercial entities; all
such business associations were defined as "companies." 20 4 Next, Judge Reavley
looked at the plain meaning of the phrase "[c]ompanies constituted under the ap-
plicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed
companies thereof ... -"205 It is in keeping with a "well-established principle" of
international law to follow the Article XXII(3)'s plain meaning, Judge Reavley
argued. 20 6 Judge Reavley found this position confirmed by the structure of the
Treaty as a whole, 207 as well as in secondary sources. 208 Finally, Judge Reavley
saw his result as fair to all parties:
204. Id. at 364.
205. Id. (quoting Treaty, supra note 13). If the phrase does not mean what it says, Reavley
argued, the majority must first decide what it does mean; second, explain why the drafters of the
Treaty nowhere explicitly answered the question of how to determine corporate nationality; and
third, justify its choice of using the determinate of an unspecified percentage of the companies'
shareholders. Id. at 364-65. This last point is interesting because the instant case and all other
cases on point involve wholly owned subsidiaries. What would the majority say about an Ameri-
can corporation that is owned 90% by a Japanese company and 10% by an American partner?
51% to 49%? 50% to 50%?
206. Id. at 365 n.6 (citing Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3,42; Herman Walker, Jr., Companies, in R.R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMER-
CIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 182, 193 (1960) (defining the place of incorporation test
as the "simple classical test" of corporate nationality)).
207. Id. at 365-69. According to Judge Reavley, the drafters of the Treaty created three terms
of art to describe the various potential actors: nationals, companies, and "enterprises controlled
by such nationals or companies." Id. at 365. If, as the majority held, an enterprise controlled by
a company is treated the same as a company, there is no need for separate classifications. Id.
Two provisions of the Treaty support the argument that a company has the nationality of its
place of incorporation. Id. First, Article VIII(l) accords companies of Japan national treatment
in the United States for commercial activities, industrial, financial, and business activities (and
likewise for companies of the United States in Japan). Id. Second, Article XXI(1)(e) empow-
ers, for example, the United States to deny national treatment to a company of Japan if it is
owned and controlled by North Korea. Id. at 366. Under the majority's holding, this provision
would not be necessary because the exemplar company would be deemed a company of North
Korea. Id. A number of articles in the Treaty grant rights to companies of either party and then
specifically extend those rights to enterprises controlled by such companies, however Article
VIII(l) extends its rights only to companies of either party and does not mention enterprises
controlled by such companies. Id. at 366-67 nn.7-11 (citing Articles VII(l), VII(4), XVI(2),
VI(3), paragraph 2 of the Protocol, and VI(4)). Further, "[u]nder normal principles of statutory
interpretation, if a party or item is specifically enumerated in one section of a statute but omitted
from a similar enumeration in a closely-related section, the exclusion is held to be intentional
and meaningful unless plain reason or authoritative sources indicate otherwise." Id. at 366.
208. Id. at 369-72. Again, in an attempt to sum up his analysis as briefly as possible, Judge
Reavley began with a quote from a contemporaneous memo by Secretary of State Dean Acheson
that seems to definitively answer the issue posed:
[A]rticle XXII, Paragraph 3, which establishes that whether or not a juridicial entity
is a "company" of either Party, for treaty purposes, is determined solely by the place
of incorporation. Such factors as location of the principal place of business or the
nationality of the majority stockholders are disregarded.
Id. at 370. This Author, like Judge Reavley, "cannot imagine a more authoritative or explicit
rejection of the majority's view." Id. Faced with the same fact pattern in reverse (a Japanese-
incorporated subsidiary of a United States corporation operating in Japan), Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger explained to the United States embassy in Tokyo that the company was a com-
pany of Japan, regardless of its American ownership. Id. (citing Telegram from Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of State, to the Department of State, Tokyo 11177 (Aug. 15, 1975)). Judge Reavley
also came to opposite conclusions regarding the secondary sources cited by the majority. Id.
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The line between Japanese incorporation and American incorporation is a bright
and distinct one. If Japanese investors choose to cross that line in order to gain
all the benefits of our legal system on a basis equal with American corporations,
I find it eminently reasonable that they accept legal responsibilities and duties on
an equal basis as well. 209
Third, turn to Title VII, which protects against discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, or religion, but has its own inherent weakness: the BFOQ
exception.2 10 The exception allows discrimination on the basis of sex, religion,
and national origin, but not race, where such characteristic is a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise. '2 11 This presents a loophole in the best of times, one that
can be expanded and exploited by one intent upon turning back the clock in the
field of employment discrimination. Why interpret it even more broadly in the
international context where the possibility for abuse by a foreign corporation with
a worse record of sex discrimination is even greater?
What is the worst possible way to interpret the potential ambiguities and con-
flicts created by the interaction of the Treaty and Title VII? It is, of course, the
result that languishes as the law today, presumably imparting a chilling effect on
any future litigation or settlement negotiations.
The courts began to move astray with Avagliano H, in which the Second Cir-
cuit, wherein many international businesses are headquartered or represented, held
that the Treaty did protect locally incorporated subsidiaries of Treaty partners and,
although it did hold that the Treaty did not exempt it from Title VII, held that
Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ.2 12 The court was wrong on the first issue
and unaware of the implications of its holding on the second issue, particularly its
statement that in determining whether Japanese citizenship was a BFOQ, the court
could consider, in the words of the district court, inter alia, "acceptability to those
persons with whom the company does business." 2 13 What the court failed to real-
ize is that as a practical matter, this would result in exactly the structure that emerged
at Sumitomo New York: American women working in clerical roles for Japanese
men. This is because at the executive level the Japanese workforce is extremely
homogeneous, consisting of men who in addition to being all of the same national
origin, are all of the same race. Thus the "acceptability" language used by the
court allows a Japanese company to legitimately (as the law stands) find Japanese
nationality a BFOQ and hire only acceptable applicants who will all be of the same
race and gender.
The Fifth Circuit in Spiess I followed Avagliano II in finding that a domesti-
cally incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese parent was indeed covered by the Treaty,
209. Id. at 369.
210. Discussion about the propriety of the BFOQ exception and how broadly or narrowly it
should be applied in the wholly domestic context are worthy topics for consideration, but out-
side the scope of this Article. See Rachael L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer Preferences for Sex
and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 493 U. OF
Cmi. LEGAL F. (1999); Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertain-
ment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2001).
211. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(e)(i) (2000); supra text
accompanying note 5.
212. Avagliano II, 638 F.2d 552, 558-59 (2d. Cir. 1981).
213. Id. at 559.
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but went one step further in holding that Title VII did not abrogate the right to
discriminate allowed by the Treaty.2 14 However, the Supreme Court then took up
Avagliano 11, sub nom. Sumitomo. It wasn't so much what the Court did in Sumitomo
that has caused harm, but rather what it did not do. In footnote nineteen, repro-
duced in full above, 2 15 the Court "expressed no view" as to whether a subsidiary
could not directly invoke the Treaty rights of its parent, and second, remanded to
determine if Sumitomo could demonstrate that it was entitled to use Japanese na-
tionality as a BFOQ.2 16
As noted above, the case thereafter settled and the task of answering those two
questions fell upon the Third Circuit in MacNamara, which held not only that a
BFOQ exception could be applied, but that the exception should be applied more
broadly in the international context.2 17 If that wasn't enough, the court then held
that plaintiffs could not use Griggs' "disparate impact" analysis, but must prove
intent to discriminate. 2 18 How, one asks, can the plaintiff prove intent, especially
in the new, broader international standard, when dealing with an extremely homo-
geneous, male-dominated nation such as Japan, or in MacNamara's case, Korea?
This heightened standard must inevitably impose a chilling effect on litigation.
Further, why should an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation be al-
lowed to assert its parent's Treaty rights? MacNamara involved a Korean branch
operation, not a subsidiary, so the issue of a subsidiary invoking the parent's Treaty
rights was not answered there. But the Seventh Circuit in Fortino and the Fifth
Circuit in Papaila soon held that the answer was "yes." This flies in the face of the
plain language of the Treaty. Equally clear, it is fair to require a foreign company
seeking Treaty protection to simply operate as KAL did, as a branch, thus avoiding
the whole issue. It seems fair to require that if a company wants the benefits of
incorporation under state law within the United States, that it live up to the respon-
sibilities that incorporation entails.
Thus, the result that stands today is that branch offices and domestically in-
corporated subsidiaries of a Treaty partner may invoke Treaty protection. They
may, to the extent still burdened by Title VII, invoke the BFOQ exception for
national origin discrimination; they may have the degree of the exception con-
strued more broadly than in a wholly domestic situation; and they may be immune
from a Griggs "disparate impact" analysis, requiring the plaintiffs to prove dis-
criminatory intent.
As a final point of contention, recall that the court rejected Spiess's argument
that Article VIII(l) should be read to grant national treatment to the Japanese in
their employment decisions. Instead, the court found it apparent from the phrase"of their choice" that Article VIII(l) did not merely grant national treatment but
rather was an "absolute rule" permitting the Japanese to staff their overseas invest-
ments with their nationals. 2 19 But if it is truly absolute, why can't Japanese com-
panies hiring executives "of their choice" choose to hire only white males for the
positions staffed by Americans? The court created a conundrum by holding that
Article VIII(l) is an absolute rule, but applying it as absolute only as to nationality.
214. Spiess I, 643 F.2d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 1981).
215. See supra text accompanying note 86.
216. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.176, 189 (1982).
217. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988).
218. Id.
219. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 360.
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As noted above, "absolute rules" in Treaty provisions were "intended to pro-
vide vital rights and privileges of foreign nationals in any situation, whether or not
a host government provided the same rights to the indigenous population. '220
Although the Spiess I court held that Article VIII(l) was such an absolute rule,
entitling Japanese corporations to ignore United States civil rights laws, its own
analysis indicates that the opposite effect was intended. In the Treaty, absolute
rules were used to assure freedom of travel, liberty of conscience, and religious
freedom, 22 1 the right to notification of one's embassy if arrested,222 just compen-
sation for expropriated property,2 23 and the right to travel through the host country
by the most convenient route.224 Thus, any absolute rules contained in the Treaty
guaranteed greater civil rights to (in most cases) Americans in foreign countries
with lesser civil liberties. Even ignoring the direction in which the Treaty operates
(Japanese into the United States or Americans into Japan) it turns the Treaty com-
pletely on its head to claim that Article VIII(l) is an absolute rule which guaran-
tees Japanese the absolute right to apply a lesser civil rights standard to American
citizens in derogation of the greater civil rights to which they are entitled under the
United States Constitution and statutes.
Further, if Article VIII(l) is truly absolute, as the Spiess I court believed, why
can't Japanese companies hiring executives "of their choice" choose to hire only
white males for the positions staffed by Americans? 22 5 No court has (or would)
assert that position.
What then could Article VIII(l) be intended to guard against? The Spiess I
majority inadvertently provided one answer. Perhaps the Treaties were guarding
against laws that foreign corporations operating in a host country be required to
hire a certain percentile of host country executive-level employees, such as is re-
quired in, for example, India. 226
V. CONCLUSION
As has been shown, the various circuits' interpretations of the relationship
between FCN Treaties and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have created the worst
of all possible worlds for victims of sex-based discrimination who are working for
American subsidiaries or branches of foreign Treaty partners. The cases, along
with other trends in discrimination law,227 cannot help but have a chilling effect
on legal actions to block sexual discrimination.
220. Id. at 359 (citing Walker, supra note 6, at 811, 823; Walker, supra note 7, at 232).
221. Treaty, supra note 13, article I.
222. Id. at article 11(2).
223. Id. at article VI(3).
224. Id. at article XX(a).
225. The Spiess I court even asks (but does not answer) the question of whether Japan could
violate other labor relations statutes, such as child labor laws. See Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 362 n.8
(noting that the Avagliano II court also noted this issue). See Avagliano II, 638 F.2d 552,559 (2d
Cir. 1981).
226. Spiess I, 643 F.2d at 359 (citing Walker, supra note 7, at 234, 234 n.15).
227. For example, since 1996, a victorious plaintiff pays federal income tax on not just her
award but on the lawyers' fees she is awarded in a sexual discrimination case. In one recent
instance, a police officer was awarded $3 million by a jury for gross sexual harassment. The
judge gave her the options of a reduced award of $300,000 or a new trial. When she took the
money, he then awarded fees of $850,000 and costs of $100,000. The net result? She owed
$99,000 to the Internal Revenue Service and took home nothing. Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds
Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25400985.
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Considering the current Supreme Court's recent cases in the area of civil rights,
it is perhaps fortunate that a major BFOQ/Treaty case has not appeared on its
docket since Sumitomo. But the legislature, whose silence on the issue is at least
one part of the problem, need not remain silent. For example, when the Court held
that under Title VII discrimination based on pregnancy was not sexual discrimina-
tion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,22 8 Congress responded by amending Title
VII to prohibit "sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy."2 29 Since a consti-
tutional question is not involved in the instant controversy, Congress could do the
same thing here and demonstrate its intent to close this loophole.
228. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
229. The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 701(k) (1978).
2002]
